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ABSTRACT

The theme of the doctoral honors seminar reported here was the reappraisal of rhetorical research. After a preface and the seminar's keynote address about the ten negative commandments for the rhetorical historian, abstracts of seminar presentations are grouped under the headings rhetoric and culture, rhetoric and philosophy, and discourse analysis. Abstracts deal with the following topics: Joseph Priestley personifying eighteenth century "zeitgeist," how to study the "Rhetorimachia" of Anselm De Besate, the rhetoric of Al-Farabi, Plato's knowledge of Gorgias, a synthetic theory of sympathy, reexamining the logic of Peter Ramus, Augustine on teaching, Cicero's rhetorical situation in the "Philippics," the socially constructed reality of Athenian funeral orations, a phenomenological approach to Richard Wagner's "Gesamtkunstwerk" and the emergence of conflicting rhetorical styles in post-restoration England. (RL)

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H TEXNH

Proceedings of the Speech Communication Association 1979 Doctoral Honors Seminar "Research Methods and Topics for the History of Rhetoric"

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In Memorium

MARIE HOCHMUTH NICHOLS

Conciliatrix Sapientiae Eloquentiaeque

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Preface

If one "theme" emerged from the 1979 meeting of the Doctoral Honors Seminar, then it should justifiably be defined as "re-examination." In previous proceedings, participants, senior critics, and keynote address called for disciplined attention to the periods and concerns of rhetoric which invite further examination as well as to the research techniques used in such ventures. The twelve participants, seven senior critics, and keynote speaker whose efforts are recorded in this monograph unanimously call for a reappraisal of the type and scope of research which may spring from the recent enthusiasm for rhetorical studies.

The first general session included re-evaluations by Michael Svoboda, Beth Bennet, and Mary Elizabeth Vielhaber of the works of Plato, Anselm de Besate, and Peter Ramus respectively. The participants' research and the expert commentaries by Bruce Gronbeck, William E. Wiethoff and Don Abbott pointed out the need for carefully adjusted estimates of the intellectual debts and the cultural interactions evident in ancient, medieval, and renaissance rhetorical theory. In the second general session, the research of Richard Paris (as summarized by Steve Hanneford), Robert N. Gaines, and Barbara Johnstone Koch underscored the need for continued care in interpreting the Aristotelian and Ciceronian rhetorical traditions. Critical remarks by Donovan Ochs, Michael Volpe and Richard Leo Enos amplified the call for thoroughly reviewed and revised approaches to understanding the theory and practice of classical rhetoricians, as well as recognizing non-Western civilizations which incorporated ancient rhetoric into their cultures. In the third general session, Celeste Railsback, Molly Wertheimer, and John Rindo emphasized the personal and social values which must be reconstructed in order to appreciate fully the significance of forms as diversified as classical epideictic and Wagnerian esthetics. The comments of senior critics, including Floyd Anderson, emphasized the participants' research focus and stressed the rigor with which related analytical methods must be applied. Anglophiles Jacquelin Mason, Ruth Anderson and Barbara Ann Vincent re-assessed seventeenth and eighteenth-century theories of eloquence during the fourth general session. Critical contributions by Jane Blankenship and Ray McKerrow enhanced the final session's depiction of modern British rhetoric. James J. Murphy's ironic directions to historians of rhetoric in the keynote address demonstrated the elaborate style sometimes required of "preachers" while cataloguing the scholarly and professional virtues essential to the "salvation" of rhetorical studies. Professor Murphy's subsequent discussion of questions which were posed by members of the audience and the various interest groups' later deliberations sparked the seminar's closing events with the animated exchange of viewpoints which distinguishes progressive re-examination from mere reverie.

These proceedings report the re-examination which took place on the Bloomington campus of Indiana University from March 16-18, 1979. The seminar could never have proceeded without the generous moral and financial support which was offered; ideally *H TEXNH* 1979 indicates that the support was well invested.

William E. Wiethoff

Over three years ago, when William Wiethoff and I formulated the idea of a co-sponsored, two-year doctoral honors seminar we both shared a concern for the study of rhetoric. Although the great minds who examined rhetoric throughout the ages read like an honor-roll in Western thought, we were bothered that the contemporary study of rhetoric, as well as its rich history, was not given the deference it had previously enjoyed. Our objective throughout these seminars has been to encourage the study of rhetoric by providing an opportunity for exchanging ideas among prominent researchers and promising students.

I am happy to say that as I write these words, some three years after that initial meeting, the future of rhetoric again looks promising. Even a casual glance at employment listings in English, linguistics and speech communication testify to the ever-increasing demand for rhetoricians. This bright future for rhetoric is based, in large part, upon the premise which has sustained the study of rhetoric throughout history: its practical application in social interaction. The recognition of rhetoric in the last few years has also fostered a renewed interest in its history – primarily because contemporary rhetoric is predicated upon its historical evolution. This re-emergence of rhetoric has further encouraged co-operative ventures by individuals in several disciplines such as philosophy, history and classics–to name three areas of study not mentioned above–who see rhetoric as a dimension of their research. The pervasive interest shared by these scholars has only served to increase rhetoric's acceptance and further testify to its academic worth and practical benefits.

If our efforts, and those who have given of their time and effort so generously over the last few years, have helped to encourage this renaissance of rhetoric, then our objective has been met and our concern for rhetoric's future need concern us no longer. To all who helped create the wonderful memories of these recent years I offer my sincere thanks and appreciation.

Richard Leo Enos

The A-Historian's Guide: Or, Ten Negative Commandments for the Historian of Rhetoric

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A recent book, published by Princeton University Press in 1978, argues that it was only about 1000 B.C. that mankind developed a "consciousness" and ceased to act purely from instinct like other animals. The author claims that about that time the two hemispheres of the human brain began to operate cooperatively instead of separately, making possible such activities as Thought, Reasoning, and Memory. With memory comes the beginning of a sense of human history.

I find this argument mind-boggling. We are today, especially we here today, so history-obsessed that at first I found it difficult even to visualize a human mind unaware of its own history. That is, an A-historical or Non-historical mind. Is it possible, I wondered, to conceive of an A-historian, a Non-historian?

I soon realized not only that it was possible to conceive of an A-historian, but, looking about me I found that I could actually see such a thing happening in relation to rhetoric. Not only do we have A-historians of rhetoric, but I fear that we can even identify the principles by which they are created.

It is for this reason that I wish to speak to you today about this problem of Non-history or A-history, and to identify If I can the ten principles or commandments to be followed by the A-historian of rhetoric. They are the ten Negative Commandments.

The first Negative Commandment is, Know Not What Rhetoric Is.

I would like to begin with an *exemplum* from a sister art–grammar. An interesting article was published in 1958 by Desmond P. Henry, a philosopher at the University of Manchester, England. The journal was *ALMA–Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi*–and the title of Henry's article was "Why *grammaticus?*" In discussing the treatise *De grammatico* of Saint Anselm (d. 1109), Professor Henry points out that Anselm raises a fundamental question about the nature of grammar: that is, does the Latin term *grammaticus* really mean "a person possessed of the ability to be grammatical"? This science of grammar–the capacity to exercise the art of literacy–would include both the *knowledge* of what to do with language and the *ability* to do it effectively by predicting the meanings that will result from its use.

This observation, laid down almost nine hundred years ago about rhetoric's sister art, grammar, is one that historians of rhetoric might well ponder. A short while later another medieval writer, Hugh of St Victor, clarified Anselm's principle in a way that might make it easier

for us to understand it in relation to grammar:

> Two separate concerns, then, are to be recognized and distinguished in every art: first, how one ought to treat the art itself; and second, how one ought to apply the principles of that art in all other matters whatever. Two distinct things are involved here: treating *of* the art and then treating *by means of* the art. Treating of an art is, for instance, treating of grammar; but treating by means of that art is treating some matter grammatically. Note the difference between these two—treating of grammar and treating some matter grammatically. We treat of grammar when we set forth the rules given for words and the various precepts proper to this art; we treat grammatically when we speak or write according to rule. To treat of grammar, then, belongs only to certain books, like Priscian, Donatus, or Servius; but to treat grammatically belongs to all books.

To transpose this into terms dealing with rhetoric, then, these two writers—picked at random from scores that might be quoted from all ages—are saying that an art is different from the practice of that art. To paraphrase Hugh of St. Victor, to treat of rhetoric belongs only to certain books, like Aristotle, Cicero, Campbell, or Perelman; but to treat rhetorically belongs to all books.

The problem is that you must make a personal decision on whether or not you believe that last statement, before attempting to be an historian of rhetoric. Is rhetoric the *knowledge* of what to do with language, or is it the *ability* to use language effectively? This is one of the oldest questions in our field; it was old by the time of Protagoras and Isocrates, and—if some modern observers are correct—it forced Aristotle to write the third book of his *Rhetoric* to keep up with practical competitors. Every issue of *QJS* tells us that some people, at least, still can't make up their minds.

Do not fear that you will stumble into an answer to this question. There are lost of ways to avoid even asking this question. As a compromise you can devise titles like "Black Rhetoric," or "Rhetoric of the Suffrage Movement," or "Rhetoric of Popular Music," in which the titles imply the discovery of a theory in a practice. Or you can treat the history of rhetoric simply as a history of the books that call themselves books of rhetoric—in other words, study only the Richard Whatelys, the Johann Sturms, or the Hugh Blairs. As Etienne Gilson once remarked about another field, though, the history of philosophy is not simply the history of its books. Or you can discover that there are rhetorical aspects to every language use—for instance, did it ever occur to you that virtually every sentential locution of two words or more which does not include a copulative verb tends to demonstrate purpose or attitude? Compare "it is" with "it stinks," or compare "you

are" with "you are pleasing." Like the character in Moliere's play who finds out to his surprise that he's been speaking prose all his life and didn't know it, you too can find rhetoric in everything. Our literary brethren are finding this out every day. Or, on a theoretical level, you can declare that there are simply many rhetorics anyway; one branch of this school of thought is the Symbiotic Mode, declaring that the interactive relation of each culture and its language is so close that, in effect, each culture creates its own rhetoric. The Symbiotic Mode, it might be noted, makes it difficult to deal with concepts like "Rhetorical Tradition"; another branch, though, is the New Rhetoric Mode, declaring that all the work of the past, faulty as it may have been, has now made possible the ultimate, modern, or new rhetoric, it is interesting to note that five books with the title "New Rhetoric" were published in the 1960's but none so far in the 1970's; I find it interesting also that when Chaim Perelman's *Traité de l'Argumentation* (1958) was published in the United States eleven years later, its title became *The New Rhetoric*, based on Perelman's sub-title, *La Nouvelle Rhétorique*.

So there are lots of ways to avoid either asking or answering the question. We happen to be cursed, or blessed, with being in a field in which the best (most rhetorically efficient) of us don't ever need to make up our minds about what we are doing. We can of course explain ourselves to anybody, so we don't need to explain ourselves to ourselves. So we confuse ourselves, and so we violate the first commandment of the rhetorical scholar: "I am Rhetoric, and thou shalt not have strange rhetorics before me." Everything in our culture says that the worst of all possible sins is the sin of synecdoche—that is, of mistaking the part for the whole, or, in technical graduate school terms, mistaking mere practices of rhetoric for rhetoric itself. The terrible tragedy of our times may well be that the sinner, as always, is so satisfied with himself or herself that he/she doesn't even know it's a sin. The penalty for this sin may well be tenure.

I would like to identify the other nine negative commandments of "Research Methods and Topics for the History of Rhetoric." The first Negative Commandment, as I have just pointed out, is Do Not Know What Rhetoric Is.

The second Negative Commandment is Be Possessed of Scholarly Timidity. Be timid in the face of social scientists brandishing empirical swords, which sparkle with multivariate analysis, swords encrusted with the jewels of chi-squares set firmly into a base of control groups. Be timid in the face of experts of all kinds. Be timid, above all, in the face of your elders. Do not dare to write that the Emperor has no new clothes at all, be ashamed of Peter Ramus, who is reputed to have said that everything that Aristotle wrote was false. Dare not to say that everything that Gerald Hauser, or Donovan Ochs, or Richard Enos or Bruce Gronbeck or Carl Carmichael or James Andrews or James J. Murphy or Thomas O. Sloane might possibly, say, be mistaken or incorrect,

perhaps, under some circumstances, seen in a certain way, when viewed objectively, when seen in the light of new evidence—however you may want to say it: be timid enough to think that your elders, by some virtue of chronology, know better than you. This second commandment, this arrogance born of fear, will make you untroubled and unproductive.

The third Negative commandment is Lack Imagination. Settle, not for what you already have, but for the minimum possible—whatever that might be. Take the first job offered, and stay there. Subscribe to *Boredom Quarterly*. Never ask any questions you can't answer within three minutes, or five footnotes, whichever comes first. Never wonder why there is no history of audience analysis, why no one has ever studied the James-Winans theory of persuasion (even though every television millionaire seems to know it), why there is no history of the theory of rhetorical figures, why there is no rhetorical work of Peter Ramus available in English, why there is no history of the influence of Quintilian throughout the ages—or of Cicero's *De oratore*, for that matter, why there is no explanation of the decay of rhetoric in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, why rhetoricians seem unable to talk to empiricists, why no one, even Marshall McLuhan or Walter Ong, has completely explained what the printing press did to rhetoric, why students of Renaissance rhetoric only cite nine or ten authors in their footnotes when it is now clear that nearly a thousand authors flourished in that period, or whether Chaim Perelman is right when he says that his *New Rhetoric* is the first major break in three centuries in concepts due to Descartes. Above all, if you wish to settle for the minimum possible—whatever that may be—do not think for yourself: instead, ask a friend, consult a book or even a professor, take a survey, but by no means separate yourself from the common herd and make up your own mind. Imagination raises the blood pressure, makes the pulse more rapid—and, surely, is as bad for you as a high level of cholesterol.

This leads to the fourth Negative Commandment, which is, Prefer Systems to Ideas. Subscribe to *QJS, CM, P&R, SSJ, WSCA*—no names, just initials—join the internalizing Kiwanis Club of your field, go faithfully and silently to graduate colloquia, and their national versions in Minneapolis, Houston, or San Antonio. Go to a Doctoral Honors Seminar. Perish internally by internal publication. Join a fad, like fantasy theme analysis or medieval rhetoric. Be known for what you are "in," since you can assume nobody cares what you "are." If possible, join a "school of thought." Does Lloyd Bitzer have a point of view? Line up either with it or against it. Is the *Exorcist* popular this year? Line up either with its haters or its praisers. In any case be a part of the on-going system. That will save you from those long nights that Leonardo da Vinci wrote about, lying in bed wondering whether you're doing the right thing. Thinking can be injurious to your mental health.

With this fourth Negative Commandment well in mind, that is, to Prefer Systems to Ideas, you will have no trouble with the fifth, which

is Narrow Your Interests. Restrict your on-campus interests to people in your field. Never talk to a philosopher – after all, didn't Cicero say philosophy was just a tool for us superior rhetoricians? Never talk to a linguist, or a psychologist, or an historian – after all, a person is known by the coffee-mates he keeps – and in this way your pristine vision of your subject will bloom uncorrupted by the entanglements of real life. Know Plato or Al-Fārābī or Jonathan Swift or Joseph Priestley so well that they can become for you a touchstone that illuminates all the rest of the universe. Should the student of Gorgias or Saint Augustine or Peter Ramus or Richard Wagner object that you are misled, you need only point out that "the touchstone is in the eye of the beholder." You have no responsibility to explain the whole world, after all, and it is only fair to point out to the misguided – say, students of Cicero's *Philippics*, of Anselm of Besate, of Saint Augustine, of *epitaphios*, or of nineteenth century sympathy – that you have a right to choose your own research topic (i.e., to Narrow Your Interest) and that otherwise research itself could not proceed if individuals did not have this right. Indeed, you are right to pursue this fifth Commandment, to Narrow Your Interests.

Thus follows the sixth Negative Commandment: Lack Interest. Lack interest in things you don't already know. One of the leading French writers of the seventeenth century, Michel Montaigne, had painted on his ceiling this aphorism: "I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me." This was a principle that led Montaigne into many a strange bypath. He would never have qualified as an audience member for "Laverne and Shirley," or even "Saturday Night Live." How could Montaigne have been "relevant" this way? This sixth Commandment urges you not to complicate your life by adding on new data and new experiences when you can't handle the ones you already have. Wait. Let it all simmer down. Have a cup of coffee. Have a cigarette. Take a walk. American society has lasted more than two hundred years. Why rush it now? The library will still be there tomorrow – why bother to look it up now? What difference does it make? Who cares?

This line of reasoning makes it perfectly clear why the seventh Negative Commandment is so popular: that is the commandment, Lack Energy. If you Lack Interest it is easy to Lack Energy. If nothing is particularly worth doing, why do anything? At the age of 19, of course, Cicero had written *De inventione*, one of the most influential books of any kind ever written in our culture, and of course Ludwig van Beethoven composed his first sonata at the age of ten. Be not dismayed that the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz learned Latin at the age of eight, and began his study of logic at twelve. Harry Caplan compiled his definitive list of medieval manuscripts of the *ars praedicandi* when he was very close to your age. By these standards most of us here are already "over the hill," and naturally everyone will understand if we simply don't bother to try to live up to the impossible standards of people like Karl Wallace and Douglas Ehninger and Wilbur S. Howell

and Marie Hochmuth Nichols. The seventh Negative Commandment says, "Why bother?" Someday some employer will lurch up to you and say, in effect, "What have you done for us lately?"—but until that day keep a cool and low profile.

And then there's the eighth Negative Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Covet an Historical Background. Never learn languages, so strange terms can't tempt you. Never go beyond your footnotes, for that way lies curiosity, and curiosity is the enemy of tenure. Always stick to your particular subject, and don't contaminate your understanding with unnecessary facts or background. Never look up a fact unless you have a specific reason for doing so, like filling out a footnote or winning a bet. Don't use open stack libraries, for in looking for the one book you do need, you're liable to run afoul of Muller's Adjacency Theorem, that is, that the historical value of a given book varies proportionately with its linear stack distance from a book for which you have the call number. (Some scholars, incidentally, find it useful, in this connection, to visit a library only just before lunch, or within five minutes of the departure of the last bus.) A friend of mine has this simple rule about strange books: "When in doubt don't check it out." If Hugh Blair's career interests you in Scottish nationalism, resist the temptation. If Joseph Priestley makes you wonder about Lavoisier, forget it. Nobody uses phlogiston any more anyway. When Lloyd Bitzer was preparing his Introduction to the Landmarks edition of George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* his whole general knowledge of Hume's philosophy resulted in only one sentence on page thirteen and another on page fourteen. You can avoid this kind of wasted effort, if you can be particular enough in your research, and avoid having too general an historical background. Never, for instance, read a journal like *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History*, and especially avoid issues like the November 1977 one in which Gerald Press shows how rhetorically trained Christian historians of the fifth century changed the whole nature of historiography.

Moreover, you will find the ninth Negative Commandment a great help to you: that is, Avoid Method. At Davis we have just concluded a recruiting effort which produced nearly three hundred applications. It was interesting to note that while virtually every candidate had a graduate course background in empirical, experimental or statistical methods, the "traditional" rhetoricians seemed to be remarkably free of such methodological contaminations. Just as we have seen earlier that ignorance can be an effective check against curiosity, so it seems plain that lack of method can forestall efficient historiography. A corollary of this ninth Negative Commandment is, "Beware of Transferring Knowledge From One Field to Another." If at 10:00 a.m. you castigate a sophomore for not providing a warrant for his assertion in a classroom speech, be sure that you do not yourself provide evidence for your own assertions at 11:00 a.m. when you send off your article to *QJS*. And

seek not to distinguish between the cumulation of inductive data on one hand and rhetorical amplification on the other. When in doubt, don't define your terms in your writing. In writing history, moreover, do not seek out alternative means of investigation, for this way lies much labor, and the hazard of crashing between the Scylla of The Unexplained Fact and the Charybidis of The Negative Instance. In dealing with the men or women of history, labor not unduly long over detailed biographies, for otherwise you may find that the great of the past were merely men like me and thee. And spurn the production of editions or translations, for otherwise your readers by studying them can know as much as you. And despise the lowly bibliography, for once printed it may fall into the hands of one less wise than thee, who will suck out its scholarly juices and become before the eyes of men even more expert than thee. When young, write comprehensive surveys, before details cloud your vision; when older, write criticism. Above all, this ninth Negative Commandment tells you, do not in your speakings and writings reveal to your audience which method, or methods you use, or indeed whether you use any method at all. Don't ponder, produce. Write, write, write, and the Dean will beat a path to your tenure committee door.

And this brings us to the tenth Negative Commandment, which is, Thou Shalt Not Covet a Clear Writing Style. This can be the most important commandment of all, for it can affect all the others. It is true that many people find little difficulty in obeying this commandment, but in a changing world little should be left to chance. Cultivate a healthy sense of ambiguity; for instance, in an article of, say, 2500 words it is useful to use the same word – preferably one you've specially selected for the study like "holistic" or "dynamic" – in as many senses as possible. This will make it unnecessary to use recognized technical terms in their ordinary meanings. Or you can cultivate a personal thesaurus of synonyms so that you can get through the 2500 word article without repeating a given word at all; since synonyms can never be exactly the same in meaning, this will add a refreshing sense of equivocation that will confound your critics. As for organization, always begin by writing the word "the," then letting your pen take you where it will. In other words, don't be a slave to structure. Learn four or five simple organizational plans to avoid. Remember that the basic principle of progression in writing is Audience Induction; that is, you can expect any reader to realize that the order of presentation of ideas has no relation to the conclusions to be drawn from them. Make a thesaurus of transitional phrases to avoid, like "therefore," "next," "on the other hand," and the like. After all, Marshall McLuhan has proved that the world is a seething mass of imploding data bits, so your modern reader can be expected to know how to make a mosaic if you hand him a box of loose data bits. Long gone is the day of coercive rhetoric in which the writer forced his personal, idiosyncratic patterns into the eyes of readers. Let the reader be inductive – he may enjoy the puzzle. To add further

excitement to the reader's task, you may from time to time wish to introduce a paragraph here or there on some subject of particular interest to you. The reader will enjoy trying to figure out how—and whether—these paragraphs relate to the other materials you present. Some writers cultivate a personal collection of all-purpose paragraphs for this; some frequent subjects are: The Value of Rhetoric, Rhetoric and the Social Order, Rhetoric and Literature, Rhetoric and Politics, and so forth. Let your imagination be your guide. In any case a decent regard for the opinions of mankind should tell you that with several thousand words of unstructured ambiguity you too can be an average historian of rhetoric.

But now, you may well ask, what should I do, to be a true A-historian, once I have mastered these ten commandments? Indecision is the mother of inaction. Your best plan of action, year in and year out, is to do brief studies on a wide variety of topics. For your own sake your personal bibliography should show a healthy mix of studies on, say, Plato, Richard Whately, renaissance emblem books, a definition of "social movement," women's rhetoric, the speeches of Hiram Johnson, and of course the mandatory "New Look at the Enthymeme." Avoid being trapped into definitive knowledge of any one field. Above all, write only for the speech journals; within seven years you can be sure that you will know every member of your reading audience personally; avoid the slings and arrows of outraged philosophers or the linguist's contumely. To thine own career be true, and you cannot then be faulted by any man.

Let me conclude.

I have a dream. I have a dream that younger scholars are, in potency, greater in their scope and abilities than we older workers in the field, I have a dream that whatever impels you young people to pursue Anselm of Besate or Joseph Priestley will someday unite you with your fellows, to fill in the enormous chasms of ignorance about rhetoric, to level the mountains of confusion and distrust about rhetoric, to weave a seamless cloak of knowledge about one of the most fundamental activities of a human being—his power to communicate, and to understand how he communicates. I have a dream that you can help us all appreciate how that understanding has grown over almost three thousand years, so that we today may understand better.

I have a dream, but you can, if you wish, make that dream a nightmare. You—and we elders, too, for that matter—can follow the recipe for nightmare that you have just heard laid out in the Ten Negative Commandments. You can make your highest ambition the status quo. You can settle for the mediocre. You can pick as your role model someone in this room, rather than someone like Paul Kristeller or Harry Caplan or A. O. Lovejoy or Hannah Grey.

Nightmare or dream, the choice is yours.

REPORTS AND ABSTRACTS

I. Rhetoric and Culture

Rhetorical scholars, we contend, need to foster an understanding of the cultural context in which the subject of their research is located. This understanding is necessary because any rhetorical artifact is embedded in its cultural milieu. However, although we believe that understanding the relationship between rhetoric and culture is important to scholars of the history of rhetoric, we do not believe that making arbitrary definitions or limitations of that relationship provide much help in preparing scholars for their research. Rather, we recommend four areas in which individual scholars may develop some basis for understanding this relationship within their own research.

First, scholars must begin with the primary texts related to their particular research area. This means that scholars must not only determine what primary texts are available, but also consult such texts directly. Scholars should not rely solely upon translated versions of such texts, but should be able to examine them in their original form. Likewise, scholars should not rely solely upon theoretical interpretations of such texts supplied by secondary sources. To aid scholars in their general preparation for research, we suggest that academic departments (1) train students in locating and constructing bibliographies of primary material, (2) encourage the study of foreign languages and discourage efforts to circumvent language requirements, and (3) advise students to take courses in historical/critical methodology, historiography, hermeneutics, and philosophy of history which may better enable them to construct and evaluate their own textual interpretations.

Second, scholars must attempt to minimize their own theoretical biases toward any text. This means that scholars should make every effort to understand how an author intends specific technical or theoretical terms to be understood. Scholars must be familiar with the author and his writing style, as well as with the author's sources. To help scholars meet these objectives, we make two general suggestions: (1) consult non-rhetorical works written by the author, such as theoretical treatises or personal papers, in order to gain familiarity with the author and his style and (2) consult non-rhetorical works roughly contemporary with the author, such as literary, philosophical, or historical works, which may provide insight into the sources of influence on the author.

Third, scholars must seek opportunities to improve their understanding of the implications of their research. Specifically, we suggest that scholars utilize the expertise of people in related research areas. For example, translations can be checked with language experts, textual interpretations can be examined by critics with special knowledge of the text, and theoretical implications can be evaluated by theorists, both in

our field and in others, with expertise which pertains directly to the research. Only in making use of such expert knowledge can rhetorical scholars guarantee the quality of their research.

Finally, scholars must remember that because of cultural constraints, the history of rhetoric cannot be studied adequately in isolation. Therefore, research in areas such as philosophy, literature, linguistics, history, religion, psychology, and sociology may provide additional insight for rhetorical scholars in their particular research areas. For this reason, we recommend that rhetorical scholars create and pursue opportunities to communicate with their colleagues in allied fields.

Ruth Anderson
Beth S. Bennet
Barbara Johnstone Koch
Michael Svoboda

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY: A UNIQUE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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Joseph Priestley personified the Zeitgeist of the Eighteenth Century. The culmination of his personages – the scientist, the educator, the political activist, the theologian, and the philosopher – describe the accepted tenets of the period in which he lived. These include a devotion to reason and the experimental method, a commitment to the individual right to self-actualization through education, a belief in the will of the people as expressed in a social contract, and a credence in the natural law as the guide to truth. These basic dogmas of the Eighteenth Century serve as a groundwork for his rhetorical theory. With nature as the foundation of his theory, Priestley relied on faculty psychology and the Hartleian association of ideas as he developed his theories on invention, arrangement, style and taste. His commitment to seek practical truth as illustrated in his various personages, as well as his eagerness to communicate that truth as illustrated in his rhetorical theory, truly make Joseph Priestley an uncommonly representative individual of the Eighteenth Century.

A PROLEGOMENON TO THE STUDY OF THE *RHETORIMACHIA* OF ANSELM DE BESATE

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As one of only two rhetorical treatises that survive from the period 819 to1050, the *Rhetorimachia* of Anselm de Besate should hold considerable interest for rhetorical scholars. In general, however, the treatise has been either misrepresented or overlooked in studies of medieval rhetoric. Accordingly, this paper provides a preliminary analysis of Anselm's *Rhetorimachia* and a discussion of objectives necessary for future research.

The *Rhetorimachia* is divided into three books, all of which maintain a rhetorical attack upon Anselm's cousin, Rotilandus. Book One attacks a letter which Anselm allegedly received from Rotilandus. Anselm criticizes the style of the letter, the validity of its arguments, and Rotilandus' claims to virtue. Book Two attempts to reaffirm the virtue of Anselm's character. This reaffirmation begins indirectly as Anselm relates a vision in which he is transported to Elysium. There Anselm is lauded by the saints and is told of Rotilandus' wickedness. With the end of the vision, Anselm begins a direct defense of himself as a virtuous and learned man. Book Three resumes the direct attack on

Rotilandus wherein Anselm describes specific examples of Rotilandus' corruption. Anselm ends the treatise by remarking that having completed his extended example of judicial rhetoric, he plans to write a fourth book illustrating demonstrative rhetoric.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the paper shows that although the *Rhetorimachia* is a product of the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition, the treatise differs considerably from such rhetorical works as Alcuin's *Disputatio de rhetorica et de virtutibus* and Notker Labeo's *Noua rhetorica*. The paper concludes that in order to determine the theoretical importance of the *Rhetorimachia*, future research needs to provide a careful study of the sources used by Anselm, an analysis of his application of these sources, and an examination of the implicit rhetorical theory within the treatise.

THE RHETORIC OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ: A MEDIEVAL ARAB INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE

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This paper begins with a historical and intellectual overview of the 'Abbasid empire, in which Al-Fārābī, a tenth-century Arab philosopher and commentator, lived and wrote. Next, a brief summary of Al-Fārābī's biography and his general philosophical views is given. Then, a description of Al-Fārābī's view of Greek philosophical rhetoric is presented, drawn from several of his works. Two striking differences between Al-Fārābī's rhetoric and Aristotle's are noted: Al-Fārābī's conception of rhetoric as an abstract branch of logic, as opposed to Aristotle's more practical view, and the absence in Al-Fārābī's work of the notion of rhetoric as potentially bad or dangerous logic. In conclusion, a possible historical and social reason for these differences is presented.

PLATO'S KNOWLEDGE OF GORGIAS

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This paper extends the work of Coulter and De Romilly, arguing that Plato is familiar with the major works of Gorgias. Support for this position is drawn from the presence in Plato's dialogues of wordings, propositions, examples, images, forms of argument, and overall speech structures similar to those found in the major fragments of the historical Gorgias. Further support draws upon the presence of references to persons or events associated with Gorgias in dialogues where Gorgianic ma-

terial is discussed or is relevant. Three dialogues each contain several such allusions and references with special regard to one of Gorgias' works. They are: *The Apology (Defense of Palamedes)*, *Gorgias (The Encomium of Helen*, with a few allusions to *Palamedes)*, and *Parmenides (On The Non-Existent)*. The study concludes from these pairings that Plato knows Gorgias' work and that his arguments against Gorgias are reasonable responses to genuine Gorgianic positions. There are differences between the ways Gorgias and Plato use the same topos or proposition, but the contrast functions as a part of Plato's arguments against Gorgias. The study implies that a more conservative interpretation of Gorgias' works might be in order, as no discussion of "the necessity of deception" (Untersteiner, Rosenmeyer, Gronbeck) has thus far been found in any dialogue where Gorgianic material is prominent. Finally, the study suggests that continued work with Platonic allusions might produce a theory of the rhetoric of allusion.

II. Rhetoric and Philosophy

The "metarhetorical" level of analysis provides the common denominator for the three topics of the papers presented under the rubric of "Rhetoric and Philosophy." A definition of "metarhetoric" is provided by James J. Murphy in "The Rhetoric of Plato, Augustine and McLuhan: A Pointing Essay":

> I would propose that metarhetoric is the counterpart of epistemology. Metarhetoric investigates what a rhetorician needs to know in order to be a rhetorician. It examines the first principles, either stated or left implicit, upon which a rhetorician bases his whole activity. As men differ widely, their views of such first principles may also be expected to vary widely.[1]

Although the papers differ in that they study the fourth, sixteenth and eighteenth centuries of Western thought, they all concentrate upon the motivating principles of thought within their centuries. After meeting and reviewing the thrust of each other's concerns, we agree that no precise restriction can define the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. Instead, we offer the metarhetorical level as a helpful concept which allows a multiplicity of critical questions to be examined. We consider metarhetorical analysis to delve into the philosophical foundations of rhetorical thought; that is, the underlying issues which motivate the conception of a principle for communication.

A rhetorician's worldview is the focus of metarhetorical analysis. For example, Molly Wertheimer explores two critical issues for understanding Saint Augustine's notion of teaching others: first, Augustine's view of signs, i.e., the way language works in promoting meaning; and second, his theological assumption concerning the radical separation of people based on the Fall. Mary Vielhaber's study of Peter Ramus examines the influences on Ramus' thinking, the intellectual climate of the sixteenth century and the evaluations of Ramus' contemporaries as well as subsequent logicians. Jacquelin Mason analyzes the emergence of sympathy as a synthetic rhetorical strategy in the eighteenth century due to three philosophical principles: first, knowledge and reason are based upon sensations, feelings and emotions; second, the psychological focus of the thought needed in order to build a science of human nature based upon an empirical application of the natural sciences; and third, the impetus for study was the concern for the workings of the mind and the soul.

We wish to make suggestions for future research based on the concept of metarhetorical analysis. First, we see the necessity for study-

[1] James J. Murphy, "The Metarhetorics of Plato, Augustine, and McLuhan: A Pointing Essay," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 4 (1071), 202.

ing other disciplines as a resource for understanding the ethical, aesthetic, religious and metaphysical doctrines which enter into rhetorical theory. Journals from academic areas other than speech communication also report advances in rhetorical research. Similarly, learning different languages can open worlds of knowledge concerning communication. In other words, we call for a rigor in rhetorical studies stimulated by scholarly interest rather than restricted by known boundaries. Second, we caution against the tendency for limited insight when the student of rhetoric tries to solve the philosophical questions posed in focusing upon the metarhetorical level of analysis. Rather than engage in philosophical debate, the rhetorical scholar must decline to enter the brawl and instead stand back to view the "rhetorical" issues of philosophical questions. Third, we suggest looking at contemporaries of a given writer to understand his philosophical orientation. We recognize that every culture has a sense of order which defines the scope and boundaries for rhetorical thought. Finally, we urge for the adoption of a methodology of research which defines terms and reveals criteria for analysis. When one assumes a philosophical focus, one should learn to understand systems of thought. Students of rhetoric need to understand the philosophical assumptions which dominated thought and, thus, rhetoric through history.

Jacquelin Mason
Mary Elizabeth Vielhaber
Molly Wertheimer

A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF SYMPATHY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES OF KAMES, HUME, SMITH AND CAMPBELL AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HISTORY OF RHETORICAL THEORY

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In questioning the mystery of the human mind and soul, eighteenth-century philosophers advanced the concern of rhetorical theory into the realm of psychology. This paper focuses upon the theory of sympathy as an emerging rhetorical strategy of the period's psychological orientation. It traces the theory of sympathy through the primary works of Lord Kames, David Hume, Adam Smith, and George Campbell. An overall eighteenth-century definition of sympathy was the innate capacity of the human mind to reflect or feel the emotions of another person. These four philosophers wanted to build a science of human nature based upon an empirical application of the natural sciences. Kames, Hume, Smith and Campbell saw sympathy as an integral part of the communication process between the speaker and the audience. Two primary conclusions are posited in the paper. First, a synthetic theory of sympathy which combined stylistic devices and substantive modes of proof to induce belief in an audience emerged from the eighteenth century. The synthetic theory blended a cognitive level of reflection with an emotional level of feeling. Second, the synthetic theory was philosophically grounded in the notion of a communal bond of society inherently existing in sharing sympathy.

The analysis provided in this investigation concentrates on five primary works according to four criteria. First, each theorist's definition of sympathy was examined to locate the nature of content and style as involving a totally emotional and/or cognitive level between the speaker and audience. Second, the theorists were compared and contrasted to show the full impetus of the evolving synthetic theory. Third, the speaker-audience relationship was analyzed to understand the blending of stylistic and substantive concerns in the theories. Fourth, the societal perspective of sympathy as a bond for people was examined.

Two conclusions are posed to deal with the implications of the synthetic theory for the history of rhetorical theory. First, the synthesis of form and content from the eighteenth century's view of sympathy receives full application as a rhetorical perspective in twentieth-century theorist Kenneth Burke's notion of identification. Burke unites the inseparability of content and form with the idea of the commonalities of the human situation. The paper examines the similarities between identification and sympathy. Second, the founding, evolutionary synthetic theory of sympathy allows one to see the historical impetus for identification in the twentieth century. A study of the nineteenth century should analyze the role of the communal bond and the inseparability of

form and content in our own discipline and in other disciplines such as literary criticism.

THE LOGIC OF PETER RAMUS: A RE-EXAMINATION

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Peter Ramus has been both lauded and scorned for his contributions to educational reform in the sixteenth century. Ramus is remembered primarily for suggesting that logic be limited to invention and arrangement of arguments while rhetoric be concerned with style and delivery. The purpose of this paper is to examine the writings of Ramus on logic and their influence both during the sixteenth century and today. Reasons for Ramistic influence as well as the evaluations of both logicians and rhetoricians are examined. The analysis of Ramistic influence strongly suggests that his influence was due not to the scholarly merits of his writing but to the problems inherent in the complexity of scholastic logic, to the use of the printing press, and to the simplicity of his work. The evaluations of subsequent logicians support the claim that Ramus' work did little to advance the understanding of logic while it enjoyed immense popularity during the sixteenth century. In fact, scholars who study the history of logic argue that Ramistic logic is important because of its influence on the common person and not because of its profundity. The intention of this study is to claim that we must continue to re-examine Ramus, his work, and his influence on the growth of logic and rhetoric.

AUGUSTINE ON TEACHING

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Augustine was deeply concerned with education because he thought instruction in the principles of Christian faith would lead learners along the path to salvation. With such urgency motivating him, he developed a theory of pedagogy so that teachers would have guiding principles to rely on while acquiring skills of instruction. Three of his works are explicitly pedagogical. *On Christian Doctrine* deals with the problems of extracting truths from received texts (Books I-III) and presenting these truths to others (Book IV). *The Teacher* explores the relationship between language and learning, drawing the conclusion that the "Inner Teacher" is responsible for the creation of meaning within a listener/learner. And the *First Catechetical Instruction* concerns the teacher's morale or attitude about the activity of instructing others.

In this paper, I begin with two basic ideas from *First Catechetical Instruction*; these ideas overlap and both involve the reasons why teachers often develop antipathy for the task of instructing others. (1) As teachers, we may think our discourse dull when we compare the oral expression of our ideas to the way these ideas are entertained in private meditative experience. And (2) we become disappointed when listeners fail to respond to our instruction. Concerning the first problem with morale, Augustine reminds us that, in this life, even the truths enjoyed in private meditation are not as clear as we might like them to be. And concerning (2), Augustine reminds us that there is a radical separation among "fallen men" so that when a learner fails to respond to instruction, we cannot with certainty assign as cause our own discourse because other factors may be operating. Augustine suggests that we adapt our discourse as well as we can to the temperaments of our hearers and their trained habits of mind. Such adaptation can increase the chance that listeners will learn from our discourse. Ultimately, however, the "Inner Teacher" alone is responsible for growth in learners. I have supplemented the suggestions on adapation which Augustine made in *First Catechetical Instruction* with incidents from his experience as related in the *Confessions*.

III. Discourse Analysis

The aim of this discussion is to construct a definition of "rhetorical criticism" from the answers to three questions which we believe are essential to any adequate analysis of that term. Our first question is, "What are the proper objects for rhetorical criticism?" To this we reply, "All instances of purposive symbol use," where the extension of "purposive" is restricted to include only the symbol-user's purpose to inform or persuade. The second question is, "What are the functions of rhetorical criticism?" Our belief is that the functions of rhetorical criticism are to (1) elucidate and (2) evaluate symbol use or discourse *as rhetorical*, as well as to (3) increase the store of the principles of rhetoric. The third question is, "How does rhetorical criticism perform these functions?" In our answer to this question, we shall treat each function separately.

To elucidate symbol use as rhetorical is merely to isolate or identify what a symbol-user has done to achieve his or her purpose for the discourse. The symbol-user's purpose may either be learned from admission or testimony or be constructed on the basis of pragmatic implication. The symbol-user's actions to achieve his or her purpose may be identified through various types of analysis, including, for example, analysis of symbol-user strategies in composing and presenting the discourse of interest.

To evaluate symbol use as rhetorical, we insist, is to make a judgment regarding the degree to which a symbol-user's discourse constitutes a successful attempt to achieve his or her informative or persuasive purpose for the symbol use. Such evaluation may be carried out through the application of one or more of the following criteria: (1) the effects of the discourse insofar as they may be determined, (2) the principles of rhetoric, (3) general propositions which cohere with but are not contained in the principles of rhetoric. A symbol user's discourse may be said to be a successful attempt to achieve his or her purpose only if the actual effects of the discourse are consistent with the symbol-user's purpose or if the discourse itself is consistent with either the principles of rhetoric or general propositions which cohere with those principles.

To increase the store of the principles of rhetoric is to formulate some general proposition, previously not included among such principles, which applies to what a symbol-user has done to achieve his or her purpose in a piece of discourse. This newly discovered proposition either forms the basis of an account of the actual success of the symbol-user's discourse at producing effects consistent with his or her purpose, or it coheres with the accepted principles of rhetoric.

Although no full explication of our definition of rhetorical criticism is possible here, we do wish to call attention to two last features. First, our definition includes as appropriate objects for rhetorical criticism certain forms of symbol use which are customarily excluded

from the consideration of the rhetorical critic, including visual designs such as paintings, statues, and buildings, acoustical designs such as musical compositions, and certain forms of non-verbal behavior such as dancing. Our contention is that any form of symbol use is subject to rhetorical criticism if its purpose is informative or persuasive. Second, our definition excludes from rhetorical criticism certain forms of discourse analysis which are commonly characterized as rhetorical. These include strictly aesthetic, thematic, structural, and ethical criticisms which focus primarily on something other than the symbol-user's attempts to inform or persuade with his or her discourse. Our view is that no analysis of discourse constitutes rhetorical criticism unless it takes as the basis of its elucidation, evaluation, or theorizing what a symbol-user has done to achieve his or her purpose.

Robert N. Gaines
Celeste Railsback
Barbara Ann Vincent

CICERO'S RHETORICAL SITUATION IN THE *PHILIPPICS*

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Despite their importance to any complete understanding of Cicero's political oratory, the *Philippics* have been almost totally ignored by scholars of rhetoric. In an effort to somewhat remedy this lack of attention, the present study examines the Ciceronian *Philippics* as a unified response to a distinct rhetorical situation. The critical approach used in the investigation is constructed along lines suggested by Bitzer's analysis of the rhetorical situation into exigence, audience, and constraints.

The study begins with a sketch of the historico-political context which gave rise to the *Philippics*. Specifically discussed are two aspects of that context during the period 17 March to 19 December, 44 B.C.: Mark Antony's political ascendence and Cicero's early reaction to Antony's growing power.

Thereafter, the study proceeds in two major segments. Within the first, the *Philippics* are treated as a unitary discourse responding to a rhetorical macrosituation. Here Cicero's *Philippics* are shown to function as a fitting response to the primary exigence of Antony's political ascendency, the expectations of the rhetorical audience with respect to that exigence, and the rhetorical constraints offered by an extremely complex set of political circumstances related to that exigence.

The second segment analyzes the *Philippics* as a series of discourses responding to diverse rhetorical microsituations. In this segment, it is demonstrated that Cicero sustains his overall rhetorical response throughout the maturation of the rhetorical macrosituation by effectively adapting individual *Philippics* to a wide range of secondary rhetorical exigences, relevant audiences, and attendant constraints, as well as to his overriding rhetorical objective – the destructive modification of Antony's political ascendency.

EPITAPHIO: A SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED REALITY

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The Athenian State Funeral Orations present a "myth of the 'people'" in which the Athenians, because of their ideal heritage, are pictured as having all the qualities of the Homeric heroes – a myth of the Athenians as completely invincible, just, kind, intelligent, and honest. This "myth of the 'people'" was not consonant with reality. The Athenians had lost wars, and they were not always just, or kind, or honest.

Despite the false picture of reality it presented, this "Heroic Greeks" myth was widely accepted. It lasted over a hundred years, echoed throughout the culture, and lurks still in our modern appraisal of Athenians. Five probable causes for its acceptance suggest themselves.

First, through this myth the Athenians gained the self-pride and self-confidence they needed to meet the demands of times of war. Second, the myth resonated with the traditional "fantasy themes" of the culture. Third, because the funeral orations were epideictic, they stressed values rather than facts, and they faced no opposition. Fourth, the myth was presented as a mere abstraction—no sacrifice was required of the Athenians if they were to accept it. Finally, the myth provided ideal role models, which the Athenians lacked.

Further studies of other similar situations, such as Hitler's Germany, the Reverend Jim Jones' cult, or perhaps even Khomeini's rise to power, are necessary to confirm that these causes are generalizable. However, this case study provides information about what causes people to accept socially constructed views of reality which clash with the physical reality, and, perhaps, thus provides us keys to avoiding such false constructions in ourselves.

WAGNER'S *GESAMTKUNSTWERK* AS RHETORIC: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

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Hitler recognized no ideological predecessor with the exception of Richard Wagner, the intellectual giant of the 19th century. In Wagner, Hitler found the granite foundations for the Nazi ideology. Wagner was unlike other opera composers; he was an active revolutionary throughout his career. His main goal in life was to establish a unified Germany, a nation united through the *Volk*, the community of pure blood. In order to achieve his goal Wagner attempted to mobilize the cultural mythology of the Germanic people into a powerful, moving rhetorical art work, the *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Wagner hypothesized that a successful combination of all the arts, under the control of one master artist, would move crowds in such a way as to cause them to become totally immersed in the world of the work. The *Volk* would come to identify with the characters, the archetypal images, the rhythm, and the situations within the opera. Wagner sought to unify all members of the pure blood line by making them believe that they were part of a master race which must guard against Jewish invaders.

A phenomenological approach is needed for effective criticism of this rhetorical situation, for only the agent's perception of rhetorical stimuli can be used as accurate evidence for building a rhetorical theory

capable of analyzing a subconscious system. The critic must examine how the agents viewed the opera in that time and in that place. Only then can we understand Hitler's claim: "Whosoever wants to understand National Socialist Germany must know Wagner."

THE EMERGENCE OF CONFLICTING RHETORICAL STYLES IN POST-RESTORATION ENGLAND: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE "BATTLE OF THE BOOKS"

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The late seventeenth century in England was a time of invention in science, exploration in philosophy, and re-examination in rhetoric and literature. Philosophers such as Locke and Bacon wrote extremely influential treatises which probed into the faculties of the human mind and developed new, intriguing ideas about the use of reason in the human endeavor. This fascination with reason took practitioners of rhetorical style in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century in two distinctly different directions. One group followed rationalism to its end in scientific exploration and invention, while the other group developed a philosophy of rhetorical practice and theory built upon the theories of John Locke.

This paper explores the ideas prevalent in post-Restoration England which affected rhetorical style throughout the eighteenth century. The conflict between the cryptic language of rationalism and the flowing prose of neo-Ciceronianism surfaced visibily in the publications of cultured men of the age. At the dawning of the new century, in 1704, a work was published which later lent its name to this conflict of rhetorical styles. The work was *The Battle of the Books*, the subject in large part was the controversy between classical and contemporary rhetorical style, and the author was Jonathan Swift.

The present study suggests a relationship between the philosophies of the period and the subsequent controversy over rhetorical style exemplified in Swift's book; this study outlines those philosophies upon which eighteenth century rhetorical style was later to be built.